ADHYAASA - Explanation

ADHYAASA

Notes on Shankara's exmination of the nature of 'Error' in the introduction to the 

Brahmasutra. These notes are essentially a rewording, omitting most of the Sanskrit, 

of the notes provided by Kuntimaddi Sadananda on the Advaitin List and I gratefully 

acknowledge his permission for this. In turn, he wishes that I acknowledge his own 

indebtedness to H.H. Swami Paramaarthaananda of Chennai/India, himself a student of 

Swami Chinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. His lectures form the basis of these notes. 

The Brahmasuutra is the third of the so called 'Three pillars of Vedanta', the first two being 

the upanishhad-s (shruti - the scriptures 'revealed' and not 'authored' by anyone) and the 

Bhagavad Gitaa (smRRiti - the 'heard' scriptures passed down by memory). 

The Brahmasuutra is a very terse and logical examination of the essential teaching of 

the upanishhad-s, seeking to show the nature of Brahman and the superiority 

of the philosophy of Vedanta. It is usually studied with the help of a commentary or

 bhaashhya, the best known being the one by Shankara. 

It is in the nature of man, with his intellect, that he seeks to enquire into the causes of 

observed phenomena. The six topics of enquiry for a 'student of life' relate to the individual,

 the world, the cause for these two, suffering, liberation from this suffering and the means 

for attaining such liberation. Any consistent explanation for all of these is deemed a 

philosophy or darshana. 

There are 12 specific philosophies identified in India. Six of these are called aastika and the 

other six naastika. Aastika refers to those systems which accept the Vedas as a valid means 

for acquiring knowledge. Conversely, the naastika philosophies do not recognise the Vedas 

as valid or reliable sources of knowledge. These latter philosophies prefer to rely upon direct 

perception and inference or reasoning as the means for knowledge. 

The first of the six naastika philosophies is materialism, said to originate with the teacher of 

the Gods, BRRihaspati. It is said that this was devised in order to mislead the demons so that 

they could be destroyed. It emphasises the sense pleasures as being the purpose of life and 

does not accept such things as heaven and hell, the soul or Vedas. Modern science, with its 

belief that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, may come close to this philosophy. 

Materialism only recognises direct perception as a valid means of knowledge. This 

philosophy is not discussed in the Brahmasuutra since it is not considered worthwhile. 

The second naastika philosophy is Jainism. Some aspects of this are discussed and refuted 

later. The remaining four cover the various aspects of Buddhism. Buddha himself did not 

teach any real system of philosophy; he only had various dialogues with his disciples. 

Hence Buddhism was not initially well-developed. Later however it developed into four 

branches, each of which is analysed and criticised in the Brahmasuutra. Although all of the 

six aastika philosophies accept the Vedas as a valid means of knowledge, three of them do

 not accept Brahman and four of them given more importance to reasoning than to the Vedas.

 Only two give primary importance to the Vedas. One of these however, considers that the 

first part of the Vedas - the one concerned with ritualistic action - is more important than the 

upanishhad-s. The second gives primary importance to the last portion of the Vedas, and it is

 this that is the principal subject of the Brahmasuutras. 

A suutra literally means 'a thread'. It is a very concise statement expressing the essential 

meaning of a given idea in a logical manner, free from any defects. A simple translation is 

therefore not adequate on its own and requires additional explanation in the form of a 

commentary or bhaashhya. Because there exist possibilities for ambiguity, the various 

commentaries have led to 10 different teachings each claiming that theirs represents the 

intended meaning. 

The three most popular (in historical sequence) are known as Advaita, VishishhTaadvaita 

and Dvaita,. The commentary by Shankara is concerned with Advaita. A brief outline of the 

brahmasuutra. The Brahmasuutra consists of four chapters; each chapter is divided into four 

sections and each section is divided into topics of which there is a total of 191 or 192 

depending on how the sutra-s are divided. Most of the topics are concerned with statements 

in the 10 principal upanishads. The topics are divided into sutras of which there is a total 

of 555. Each of the four chapters is concerned with a particular theme. The first chapter 

endeavours to establish that the central theme of the upanishads is Brahman. This is

 necessary because some of the other philosophies do not accept this. The second chapter

 shows there are no contradictions in the teaching since this would constitute a defect. 

There are three types of contradiction defined - internal (i.e. the Vedic statements themselves 

contradicting each other); contradiction with statements from smRRiti; contradiction with 

logic. The third chapter discusses the means for attaining Brahman, both direct and indirect

(the latter covering such aspects as ritual etc., which are merely means for purifying the mind)

. The fourth chapter is about the 'fruits' of knowledge of Brahman, namely liberation from 

bondage and suffering, both delayed and immediate. Each topic consists of 5 aspects. The 

first is the 'subject', which is usually an idea from one of the ten principal upanishhads. 

The second element is the 'doubt' inherent in the subject (if there is none, there is no need 

for inquiry). Thirdly, the objections and reasoning of other philosophies are considered. 

Fourthly, these objections are logically refuted and a conclusion consistent with Advaita is 

drawn. Finally, the connection with the previous topic is shown. 

Shankara's introduction to the Bhashya (called Adhyaasa Bhaashya) is central to the 

entire advaitic philosophy, covering the explanation of the basic errors or mistakes

 (adhyaasa) that we make that lead us to our belief in a separate existence and hence to the 

eternal cycle (samsaara) of suffering. Prior to discussing this, however, there is an 

introduction to the use of inferential logic, since this is fundamental for understanding 

the arguments of the Brahmasuutra. 

A distinction is made between valid and illusory knowledge. What constitutes a valid means

of knowledge is crucial to the understanding of this subject of adhyaasa. (Indeed, all Indian 

philosophies discuss epistemology before moving on to ontological issues.) The senses are

 usually regarded as our principal source of knowledge but, apart from the fact that 

information from the senses is not always reliable, much of what is discussed is not directly 

observable to the senses. Thus we have to be aware of the source of the information and the

 types of error that can occur in using this as a means of knowledge. 

There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramaaNa. The first is direct perception 

either through one of the senses or possibly imagined by the mind (of things which are not 

directly present). The senses are however very specific. For example the eyes can only detect 

colour and form and are unable to hear sounds from an object. In fact, each pramaaNa has 

validity in its own sphere. If something is directly perceived, inference is not needed; if 

something can be inferred, the shaastra-s are not required. The next valid means of 

knowledge is inference from something that cannot be directly perceived. If something 

cannot be seen directly, nor inferred, it may it be reported in the scriptures or science or 

directly from someone who can be trusted. For this latter means, the principal source is the 

Vedas. It is believed that the Vedas were not written by humans and are thus free from the 

defects associated with human authorship. Effectively they are presumed to have been 

revealed to the sages, who then passed them on to their disciples by word of mouth. S

ince they are heard from a teacher they are called shruti. The three remaining means 

of knowledge are considered as part of inference itself. The Brahmasuutra relies heavily 

on inference and shruti as sources of knowledge. It should be noted that the Brahmasuutra

 itself was written by a human and therefore cannot itself be considered as a valid means 

of knowledge.

Inference Before inference can occur, there needs to be some valid data which is itself 

gathered directly or indirectly through direct perception. Otherwise, the inference could 

only be a speculation or imagination. For example one could not infer the age of the Moon 

just by looking at it and estimating it. Data must be collected first e.g. rocks could be brought

 back and carbon dated. Four aspects are involved in the process of inference. These are the 

subject or 'locus' of the discussion, the objective or 'conclusion' - that which is to be inferred

 or concluded, a 'basis' for the argument and finally an 'analogy'. An example given in the 

scriptures is the inference that there is a fire on a mountain because one is able to see smoke

 there, just as might happen in a kitchen. Here, the mountain is the 'locus'; to infer that there 

is a fire on the mountain is the 'conclusion'; the 'basis' is that smoke can be seen and the 

'analogy' is that when one sees smoke in the kitchen, it is invariably associated with fire

 (this is in the days before electricity!). 

The 'locus' has to be something that is partly visible and partly unknown; otherwise, it cannot

 be a matter of dispute. Whether or not there is a fire on the mountain is not visible or known

 - hence the dispute. Since we cannot see whether or not there is a fire, we must use inference.

 The 'conclusion' - that there is a fire on the mountain - is not observable or directly provable. 

The 'basis' is that smoke can be seen and it is on the mountain. This 'basis' is observable. Thus,

 in the example, the 'locus' and the 'basis' are both visible while that which is to be inferred, 

the 'conclusion' is invisible. 

In order for the 'analogy' to be valid, both 'conclusion' and 'basis' have to always be 

experienced simultaneously with the same locus in those examples that have been directly

 perceived, i.e. on which the inference is based. In this case, the listener is aware that fire 

invariably exists with the smoke when it is encountered in the kitchen. (It has to be this way 

around and not that smoke invariably occurs when there is fire.) 

In order to use inference them, one has to have a basic knowledge of the relationship 

between the conclusion and the basis, which has been gathered through perception. Here, 

the knowledge is that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Once this concomitant 

relationship has been established through repeated observation, only then can it be used to 

infer that same relationship in a situation where the conditions cannot be directly perceived. 

Also, direct perception forms the basis for the implied relationship from which the inference

 is drawn.

An inference can only be made about a specific object if the perceptible data has been 

gathered from that object. For example one cannot make conclusions about Mars if the 

data has been collected from the Moon. All observable data derive from the perceptible 

universe. The aatman is not perceivable. From this, it follows that, by using scientific 

observation one cannot arrive at any conclusions about the aatman. Hence, the whole of 

scientific reasoning is called 'commonplace inference' and can only deal with objects that 

can be perceived. 'Commonplace inference' has no access to knowledge of the aatman. To 

attempt to do so is like trying to hear through the eyes and constitutes an invalid means of 

knowledge. Instead of using data collected through the senses, inference may also make use 

of data collected from the shaastra-s. Here, inferences may be made about the nature of the 

aatman, since this is the subject of the shaastra-s. The implication of this is that the shaastra-s 

must be accepted as a valid source of observation. Once this has been done, the validity of 

the data need not be questioned, although different theories may be put forth to explain the 

same data. The theories may be incorrect but not the observations. All of the aastika 

philosophies have accepted the shaastra-s as a valid source; they have just reached differing 

conclusions. Without valid data, there is no basis for inference, only speculation or belief. 

Since inference based on the shaastra-s assumes that the shaastra-s are a valid means of 

knowledge, this method is only applicable to aastika philosophies. The naastika-s do not 

accept the shaastra-s. 

Therefore the Brahmasuutra is of no value to them. Inference or logic, which is based upon 

perception, could be called scientific reasoning. This is still used in the Brahmasuutra

 though, as noted above, it cannot make any statements about the aatman. Equally, it cannot 

be used to disprove Vedantic teaching. This is a mistake that many naastika philosophers 

make. The Brahmasuutra uses the same technique to disprove their claims. (They would not 

accept inference based upon the shaastra-s in any case.) It is also used to show that Vedanta 

is not illogical. In fact, it is beyond the realm of logic.

Adhyaasa

Adhyaasa means error or mistake. This is the basis of Advaita Vedanta and of Shankara's 

interpretation of the Brahmasuutra. The doctrine of Advaita Vedanta rests upon the four 

aphorisms in the Vedas: consciousness is Brahman; that thou art; I am Brahman; this self is 

Brahman. Shankara's aim is to show that the Brahmasuutra is compatible with Advaita 

Vedanta. His claim is that adhyaasa causes the cycle of birth and death with its concomitant

 suffering. Once the error is removed, that is the end of the cycle. 

Errors can arise for various reasons. When I act without knowledge, I commit an error. Even 

if I know that I am ignorant I am still making a mistake. For example, lack of knowledge of 

Sanskrit can cause errors in these notes. Even if I know the word I may still make 

typographical mistakes. Here the error is due to lack of awareness, which is also effectively 

ignorance, since I am not conscious that what is being typed is not what was intended. 

Errors may also arise if the instruments of knowledge are defective, for example if I am 

colour-blind or if there is insufficient illumination. In all of these cases, I am ignorant of the 

truth and, more importantly, I take the false as real and possibly the real as false. 

The price of these mistakes is suffering. Ignorance is the source of error and error causes 

suffering. The solution is therefore knowledge - knowledge of Brahman (Brahmavidya) 

brings realisation and release from suffering. All techniques, yoga, paths etc. are only 

methods for preparing the mind to receive that knowledge. 

Analogy of the Rope and the Snake This example originates from the commentaries of 

GauDapaada on the MaaNDuukya upanishhad. Seeing a rope in the dark, it is mistaken

 for a snake - an error or adhyaasa. We mistakenly superimpose the image of an illusory

 snake onto the real rope. In just such a way we superimpose the illusion of objects etc. 

upon the one aatman. 

If there is total dark, we would not see the rope so could not imagine it to be a snake. 

Hence 'ignorance is bliss', as in deep sleep - there can be no error. Similarly, if there is total 

light we see the rope clearly - in complete knowledge, we know everything to be Brahman. 

Knowledge is also bliss! The error occurs only in partial light or when the eyes are defective. 

Then there is partial knowledge; we know that some 'thing' exists. This part, that is not 

covered by darkness or hidden by ignorance is called the 'general part' and is 'uncovered' 

r 'real'. That the 'thing' is actually a rope is hidden because of the inadequate light or 

knowledge. This specific feature of the thing, that it is a rope, is called the 'particular part' 

and is covered. In place of the covered part, the mind substitutes or 'projects' something of 

its own, namely the snake. 

In the example then, when we say "there is a snake", there is a real part and an unreal part. 

The real part is "there is"; this is the 'general part'. The unreal part, the snake, only appears 

to be there because the 'particular part' - the rope - is covered. If light (i.e. knowledge) is 

made available, the rope is now seen. The 'general part', "there is" remains unchanged but 

the 'particular part', which was previously projected by the mind, is now uncovered and 

revealed to be a rope. The snake has not 'gone away' since it never existed, except in the 

mind of the observer, where it might have given rise to very real fears and physical effects 

(fast heartbeat, sweating etc.). 

From the point of view of actual reality (paaramaarthika), only the rope is real, the snake 

does not exist. For a perceiver who sees a snake, that snake is 'relatively' real (vyaavahaarika) 

and causes as much mental suffering as would a truly real snake. There only ever was a rope 

but the ignorance of this in the mind of the perceiver creates the illusion of a snake and the 

suffering follows. 

Once light (i.e. the light of knowledge) is introduced, the mistaken perception of the 

particular part is corrected; the unreal snake disappears and the real rope is revealed. The 

associated fear etc. also disappears. What has happened is that a valid means of inquiry has 

been undertaken into the nature of the particular part to reveal the truth of the matter. The 

valid means of enquiry in this example was the torchlight. It was appropriate because the 

mistake was brought about by the dim light. Prayer or meditation would not have been 

appropriate and would not have revealed the rope. The method has to be appropriate to the 

nature of the error. Since ignorance of our true nature is the reason for samsaara, the 

appropriate means of enquiry for removing the error is self-knowledge. 

Comparison with our own situation The analogous statement that Shankara uses is 'I am a 

samsaari', i.e. one who is subject to the cycle of birth and death. He could just as well have 

said 'I am a person' or individual. Here, 'I am' is the general part and is true. It refers to a 

conscious and existent being. It is 'uncovered'. There is no doubt in our minds that it is true; 

we need no external means of knowledge to verify it. 'A samsaari' (or 'a person' etc.) is the 

particular part and is unreal, like the snake. In this case, the truth of the situation is covered 

over, rather than projected, but is just as unreal. That we 'are' (sat) and that we are 'conscious'

 (chit) is known from the general part. What is hidden in the particular part is that we are 

bliss (aananda) (or unlimited, complete, infinite etc.). In its place, we perceive unreal aspects 

such as misery, limitedness, incompleteness etc. This error is the cause of all our suffering. 

In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to apply the torchlight of Vedantic knowledge 

to reveal the real particular part - not 'I am a samsaari' but 'I am Brahman'. Mixing of real 

and unreal When a mistake of this type occurs, what is happening is that a real part and an 

unreal part are getting mixed up and this is effectively how Shankara defines adhyaasa - 

the mixing up of real and unreal. In the case of the rope and snake analogy, the error can be 

viewed as a 'mis-perceiving of the rope' or as the 'superimposition of a snake' or as 'the mixing 

of part of a real rope and part of an unreal snake'. When we say "there is a snake", 'there is' is 

the general part, which could be viewed as belonging to the rope, which is real, while 'a 

snake' is the unreal, mentally projected, particular part. The mixing up of real and unreal 

effectively creates a third entity that is partly real and partly unreal. When someone refers 

to the 'snake', he does not realise that there are two aspects, one real and one unreal. If he 

says, "there is a long snake", the adjective 'long' in fact refers to the rope, which is real whilst, 

if he says, "there is a poisonous snake", the adjective refers to the unreal part. 

Similarly, when someone says, "I am a shopkeeper" (or whatever), he does not realise that 

the attribute 'shopkeeper' refers to the unreal part. He does not know that there are two parts, 

only one of which (I am) is real. In the mind of the ordinary 'person' these two things are 

mixed up and a single, false, jiiva is created. It is this mixed-up jiiva who is striving for 

liberation. The purpose of the Brahmasuutra is to enquire into the nature of the jiiva, 

by directing the knowledge of Vedanta so that we can discard the unreal part and become 

established in the knowledge of the real part. When this happens, realisation takes place 

and samsaara is dissolved as unreal. 

Shankara's discussion of adhyaasa This effectively divides into six topics: - the definition of 

error, objections to the theory as described, answers to these objections, showing the 

possibility for error, proof of the theory, conclusion. Definition of adhyaasa: - Shankara gives 

two definitions. The simpler is that it occurs when the attributes of one thing are

 superimposed on another. Thus a snake is seen instead of a rope or silver is seen on the 

inside of a shell. The second suggests that it occurs when a previously experienced object is 

seen instead of the actual. This accounts for the fact that a snake could not be seen instead of 

the rope unless the observer knew what a snake was and had previously seen a real one 

(or an image of one). A third indirect definition is the one mentioned earlier; that it occurs 

when real and unreal are mixed up. 

Objections to the theory: - Other systems of philosophy claim that, although the rope-snake 

error is acceptable, the superimposition of anything onto the aatman is not possible. The 

argument is that any superimposition requires four conditions to be satisfied. 

1. Perception. The object being covered must be directly perceivable, as is the rope in the 

rope-snake example. The aatman is not an object and cannot be perceived. 

2. Incompletely known. The object must be incompletely known, as one is ignorant of the 

fact that the rope is a rope. In the case of the aatman, however, the advaitin accepts that the 

aatman is self-evident and always conscious - how can there be ignorance with regard to 

something that is self-evident? 

3. Similarity. There must be some similarity between the actual object and its superimposition,

 just as a rope and snake have a basic similarity (one could not mistake the rope for an 

elephant, for example). But there is total dissimilarity between the aatman and anything else. 

E.g. Atman is the subject, anaatmaa is the object; aatmaa is conscious and all pervading, 

anaatmaa is inert and limited etc. 

4. Prior experience. In order to make the mistake, we must have had prior experience of that 

which is superimposed. We could not see a snake where the rope is unless we knew what a 

real snake was. Whilst this is possible in the case of the rope-snake, it is not possible in the 

aatmaa-anaatmaa case because we would have to have prior experience of a 'real' anaatmaa 

and it is part of the fundamental teaching of Advaita that there is no such thing; there is only 

the aatman. Accordingly, in the case of the aatmaa-anaatmaa, not one of these four conditions

 is satisfied. Therefore superimposition of anaatmaa onto aatmaa, the fundamental cause of

 our error according to Shankara, is not possible - so says the objector. 

Answers to these Objections and Showing the possibility for adhyaasa: - 

1. "The object must be directly perceivable." This is not strictly true. It is certainly the case 

that the object must be known. It is not possible to make a mistake about something about 

which we know nothing at all but it is not necessary that the object be immediately in front

 of us. This first condition should be restated as 'the object must be a known, existent entity'. 

Now, there is no problem since the aatman is known even though it cannot be seen (we know 

that we exist). 

2. "The object should be incompletely known." This is equivalent to saying that we should

 have partial, but not complete ignorance about the object. This is precisely the case with the 

aatman. We know that we exist (sat) and are conscious (chit) but we do not know that we are 

bliss (aananda). We have partial knowledge. Thus there is no valid objection. 

3. "There must be a similarity between the object and its superimposition." The counter-

argument here is that this is a general rule and that exceptions are possible. E.g. it is a general 

rule that the intelligent cause or creator is different from the material cause just as a potter is 

different from the clay from which he makes his pots. However there are exceptions such as 

the spider and its web. Here the material for the web comes from the spider's own body. 

Similarly a dreamer creates her dream from the thoughts and memories in her own mind. 

Shankara argues that this is such an exception to the general rule and that it is not necessary 

for similarity to exist. This argument on its own may seem a bit feeble. Shankara says that we 

know of cases where adhyaasa takes place when there is no similarity and gives an example 

to support his claim. We know that the sky is really colourless but nevertheless we see it as

 blue. We might also claim that it is polluted. But these are superimpositions by us of 'blue' 

or 'polluted' upon a sky which is without colour or form. This error takes place without there 

being any similarity between 'sky' and 'blue' or between 'sky' and 'pollution'. (As written, 

this argument carries little conviction . It is slightly better if 'air' or 'space' is understood 

rather than 'sky' - the Sanskrit word 'aakaasha' can mean either sky or space.) 

4. "We must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed." Shankara agrees that,

 in the rope-snake analogy, we must have had prior experience of a snake but says that it does

 not have to be a real snake; experience of a false snake would have left a suitable impression, 

too (e.g. we might have seen the snake in a movie). Another analogy encountered in the 

scriptures is seeing a ghost instead of a post and we all accept that we do not have to have 

seen a real ghost for this since we mostly do not believe such a thing exists. It is sufficient to 

have read about them. Similarly, in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa, we project an unreal 

anaatmaa. And where did we encounter the unreal anaatmaa before? In a previous adhyaasa,

 says Shankara! This leads to an infinite regress, of course, and Shankara claims that 'we never

 talk about the beginning of adhyaasa' - it is beginning-less!  Therefore (he says), there is no 

real anaatmaa and it is not necessary for there to be a real one for adhyaasa to occur. Thus all

 conditions are effectively fulfilled. In the first, the object is evident rather than actually 

perceived; in the second, the object is partly unknown; the third condition is not compulsory; 

the fourth condition is effectively fulfilled because we have prior experience of an unreal 

anaatmaa. 

Therefore the objections are not valid and the adhyaasa is possible. In fact, this is only a 

provisional refutation of the objector and a defensive argument, to satisfy both aastika and 

naastika philosophies. It uses the same scientific reasoning that was used for the objections. 

He then goes on to provide a more complete response and offensive argument for aastika 

objectors. He says that the entire rope-snake analogy is only an illustration of the concept of 

adhyaasa and is not intended to be used to prove the aatmaa-anaatmaa situation This must 

use the Vedas as pramaaNa (a source of knowledge) and not rely solely on scientific 

reasoning. In fact, even if scientific argument disproved the rope-snake adhyaasa, this would 

not affect scriptural based arguments for the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Furthermore, 

Shankara points out that the other aastika philosophies have already implicitly accepted the 

aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. All of these systems talk about aatmaa and accept the Veda's 

assertion that it is eternal. They realise that it refers to 'aham' or 'I' and claim that this is 

immortal. And yet they are conscious of the their experience of 'I am a human being', 'I am a 

father' etc., which clearly refer to anaatmaa. Therefore, according to their systems, these 

statements must be erroneous. Statements such as 'I am the body' are examples of 

superimposition of the gross body onto the aatmaa; a form of adhyaasa. If they deny this, 

they will be reduced to the stance of materialism. Thus they cannot object to this special

 case of aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Therefore they must accept the more general case, even 

though they might not have realised it. Because they had already implicitly accepted the 

aatmaa-body adhyaasa without applying their four objections, they have forfeited the right 

to claim that these apply in other cases. For example, as has already been said, the aatman 

is not directly perceivable. But this did not stop the objector accepting that the aatman was 

not the body. 

Shankara goes on to say that, although the example of the rope and snake is not based on 

shruti, we cannot legitimately object to that either because, like it or not, that is our 

experience. The objector can try to explain it but he cannot question it. The aatmaa-anaatmaa 

error, on the other hand, is based on shruti so that, again, we can try to explain but we cannot

 question it. The explanations given by the various philosophies may differ but the error 

cannot be denied. Degrees of Error In fact the aastika philosophies all agree that there is 

aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa; they just disagree about the extent to which this occurs. If the

 three statements: - I am mortal; I am a doer; I am an enjoyer; are considered, the Nyaaya and 

Vaisheshhika schools of philosophy claim that the first statement is an error but the second 

two are facts. Saa~Nkhya and Yoga schools, on the other hand, say the first two are errors 

and only the third is a fact. According to an advaitin, all three are errors. 

Proofs for Adhyaasa 

There are two shruti-based pramaaNa-s for adhyaasa, the first is 'postulated' and the second 

'inferred'. Postulated The first takes an observed fact - for example I wake up one morning 

and find the road outside is flooded - and postulates an explanation for this - e.g. heavy rain 

occurred whilst I slept. Since I slept soundly, I have no direct knowledge of any rain but, 

without such a supposition, I have no reasonable way to explain the observed phenomenon.

 Other 'unreasonable' explanations may be put forward but the one suggested is the most

plausible to the rational mind. In order to justify an improbable explanation, the more

plausible must first be discredited. Since the observed fact can only be explained in this way,

 the explanation becomes a pramaaNa or valid means of knowledge. This pramaaNa is '

perception-based'. as opposed to 'shruti-based'. Shankara's concept of adhyaasa is in fact a 

shruti-based 'postulate' since there is no mention of the subject in the Vedas themselves and 

it is in this way that it becomes a valid knowledge in its own right. Just as this principle can 

be used to explain the flooded streets, shruti-based postulates can be used to explain that the

 ideas that we are mortal, doers and enjoyers are all due to error. For example, the 

Kathopanishad II.19 says "If the slayer thinks that he slays or if the slain thinks that he is 

slain, both of these know not. For It (the Self) neither slays nor is It slain." Also the Giitaa V 8

 tells us that one who knows the truth understands that we do not act. We are not 'doers' or 

'killers' or 'killed'. Therefore, any statement such as 'I am a doer' or 'I am an enjoyer' must be 

an error, from shruti (and smR---iti) based postulate. Similarly, the notion 'I am a knower' is 

an error. The MaaNDuukya Upanishad, for example, says that the aatmaa is not a knower in 

the waking state, the dream state or the deep sleep state but is pure consciousness. Thus 

shruti-based postulate shows that this idea, that 'I am a knower', is false. (Unlike the idea 

'I am consciousness', which is not an error.) 

Another statement in the shruti says that the aatman is changeless (indestructible and 

incombustible). To be a 'doer' would involve change since this is an experience. All 

experiences, enjoying, knowing etc., are processes involving a modification of ones state

 e.g. from ignorance to knowledge. In fact, the suffix -er after a verb implies this modification 

by indicating an action or process. Since the aatman cannot change, it follows that the aatman 

cannot be a doer, enjoyer or any oth-er. The concepts must be errors or adhyaasa. 

A final argument is that, in order to be a 'doer' one would need an associated 'instrument'; for

 example, mind is an instrument of thought and sense organs are instruments of perception. 

A 'doer' would have to be associated with an instrument of 'doing' and an 'enjoyer' with an 

instrument of enjoyment. But the scriptures say that the aatmaa is not associated with 

anything and so cannot be a 'doer' etc. 

Another adhyaasa is 'I am limited' e.g. ' I am here' (and not elsewhere). The kaThopanishad

 (I-3-15) for example says that the aatmaa is beyond the five sense perceptions, is eternal and 

unlimited, beginningless and limitless. Since it is unambiguously stated that we are limitless, 

the idea that I am limited must be an error, by shruti postulate. The notion 'I am an individual

' is false; I am Brahman is the reality. The last example here is the idea that there are many 

aatmaa-s. This, too, is an error. Many of the philosophies do claim multiplicity of aatmaa - 

saa~Nkhya, yoga, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa and even vishishhTaadvaita and dvaita 

(which both recognise the importance of Vedanta. But Shankara cites the shvetaashvatara 

upanishad as clearly implying that aatmaa is one and the iishaa upanishad (V7) says "He 

who perceives all beings as the Self. for him how can there be delusion or sorrow, when he 

sees this oneness (everywhere) - all in all?" 

Thus, shruti postulate has shown that the ideas that we are mortal, doers, enjoyers, knowers, 

limited and many are all false. Inferred Earlier, the process of inference was explained as

 involving four aspects - the 'locus' of the discussion, the 'conclusion' that will be reached, a 

'basis' for the argument and an 'analogy'. The example used was ' whenever there is smoke, 

there is fire'. (The full form used for the analysis was '(we infer that) there is a fire on the 

mountain because we can see smoke, just as in a kitchen there is always fire when we see 

smoke'). Shankara's analysis of adhyaasa can be put into the first form by saying that 

'wherever there is transaction, there is adhyaasa'. He uses the example of using grass to 

catch a cow. The cow comes to the grass because, believing itself to be the body, it has 

notions such as 'I am hungry and the grass will remove the hunger, giving satisfaction'. 

It is the mistaken belief or adhyaasa 'I am the body' that causes the cow to come to the grass, 

'going after things conducive to happiness'. Conversely, if instead of holding out grass, we 

take a stick to the cow, the cow senses danger and moves off, 'going away from things causing

 unhappiness'.This is again caused by the mistaken idea 'I am the body'. In fact, in this latter 

case, it is the belief that 'I am this physical body' (as opposed to the subtle body, which cannot

 be harmed by the stick). 

This provides the 'analogy' for the inference. Man goes after things he likes and avoids those 

that he dislikes, just as the cow comes to the grass and runs away from the stick. The full form

 of the inference then becomes: '(We infer that) all human activities are based on error, 

because all activities can be considered as either coming towards or going away, just as in 

the example of the cow with the grass or stick'. "Human activity" is the 'locus'; "that it is based

 on adhyaasa" is the 'conclusion; "all activities are either coming towards or going away" is 

the 'basis'; the example of the cow, grass and stick is the 'analogy'. 

Implication of adhyaasa 

In everything that we do, we make the error of confusing what is real with what is unreal. 

We have a single experience but our understanding of it is confused. It is just like the example

 of the rope and snake. In our ignorance we have a single experience - there is a snake - but in 

fact two things are being mixed up viz. a real rope and an unreal snake. When I say 'I know', 

we think there is a single entity - a 'knower' but in fact there is a real, conscious self and 

unreal, inert thoughts. In the sentence "I am a knower", 'I am' is the 'general' part, referring 

to a real, conscious and existent being, while 'a knower' is the 'particular' part and is unreal. 

The two aspects are confused and adhyaasa occurs. The changeless part (existence and 

consciousness) belongs to aatmaa and the changing thought process belongs to anaatmaa. 

The two are mixed up and the idea 'I am a knower' is the result. Aatmaa cannot be a knower 

since it is changeless and thus cannot go through a 'knowing process'; anaatmaa cannot be a

 knower since it is inert. The two are mixed up to form a new entity, a 'knower', as a single 

experience but this is adhyaasa. 

Conclusion of adhyaasa commentary 

This understanding is not simply of academic interest; it is the source of the belief that we are 

mortal and thus brings about our fear of death and consequent insecurity. This then generates

 our constant concern with food and shelter etc. and hence our obsession with money. The 

fact is that money can only provide comforts; the basic insecurity does not go away however 

much money we may have. Adhyaasa thus directly gives rise to samsaara. Because we believe

 we are limited, we are continually trying to get those things we like in order to remove the 

perceived limitations. The belief that we 'do' anything, that we are 'doers' is due to adhyaasa 

and such actions result in the merits and demerits of karma and in samsaara. All of the

 suffering, from birth through disease, old age and death results from this fundamental error 

that we make. And so it will continue until the ignorance that is the cause of adhyaasa is 

removed. Actions are only a movement within nature, the 'play of the guuNaa'; there is no 

doer. 

The mistake takes place at all levels. With the thought 'I am the knower', the anaatmaa of the 

mind and intellect is superimposed upon the aatmaa. At the level of perception, a statement 

such as 'I am blind' superimposes the anaatmaa of the sense organ upon the aatmaa. At the 

level of the body, ideas such as 'I am a man' superimposes the anaatmaa of the body upon 

the aatmaa. All of these various ideas are deemed to be properties of the Self, thus mixing 

up aatmaa and anaatmaa in a disastrous mistake. 

And so it goes on. Because of the identification with the body, we become entangled in 

relationships with 'others' and imaginary 'needs' for 'external objects' etc. The aatmaa has no 

relationships (there is only the aatmaa) but because of the adhyaasa, the roots of samsaara 

spread everywhere. The solution is to remove the ignorance of the Self. Only this can have t

he required effect - removing any other ignorance will not affect this. Any amount of

 education or knowledge in other subjects will only result in an educated samsaari, someone 

who is knowledgeable about the anaatmaa. The error is in respect of the Self, so samsaara 

can only be removed by knowledge of the Self. 

The ignorance is not total. We already know that we exist and that we are conscious, just as 

in the rope and snake metaphor, we know that 'something' is there (if we did not there 

couldn't be any error). The aspect about which I am still ignorant is that I am Brahman. 

When we talk about searching for knowledge of Brahman, we are not endeavoring to find 

out about some new thing called 'Brahman' but about coming to realise our true status as 

Brahman. Whilst this true status is not understood, we exist under the mistaken impression 

that we are 'individuals' or 'jiiva-s'. It is the purpose of the Upanishads to remove this 

adyhaasa. 

Herein lies the difference between Vedanta and many other religions, together with science, 

that they begin with the assumption that we are inferior or 'sinners' and that we have to 

better ourselves. We waste our whole lives trying to improve our status. Vedanta tells us that 

this assumption of an inferior status is mistaken; we do not have to try to improve ourselves, 

we are already perfect, whole and without limitation of any kind. We need to enquire into 

the nature of Brahman and thereby remove our adhyaasa.